Comparative Public Policy and Religious Pressure Groups in Turkey and Pakistan

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\textbf{ABSTRACT} \hline
Religious institutions have currently emerged as more powerful actors than ever before in many Muslim countries. This matter necessitates reassessing the role of organized religion in policy-making processes in such countries. This paper is a comparative study, analyzing the role of the religious institutions, as pressure groups, in government policy in Pakistan and Turkey. Since there have been very few research projects working on comparative studies on religious pressure groups in Muslim-majority countries, this paper seeks to fill the gap through secondary research. The findings indicate that in Turkey, the common aims and interests have bound the Islamic parties and institutions together, currently emerging as a powerful political actor, challenging the strict secular system of the country. Nonetheless, the Pakistani institutions have increasingly exchanged violence for the implementation of Islamic law. The Turkish Islamic movement have a more united structure than the Pakistani ones. Nonetheless, the role and status of such groups have significantly changed over time in both countries. Likewise, amongst the two countries’ religious institutions, the Turkish mostly use civic tactics to gain power from the people, while the Pakistani ones undertake sabotage activities as leverage against the government. 
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1. Introduction

Religion has historically provided the tools for either stability of the states or social change. Reassessing the influence of religion on politics, however, is mostly stemmed from the awakening of the political role of Islam in many Muslim countries, where the current situation sees a resurgence of religiously-based political action. The effects of religion on governmental activity, however, is mediated by institutions, notably churches, synagogues, and mosques. Many key ingredients that shape political participation may be found in religious contexts, which are made by religious institutions. They have historically formed political attitudes, and accordingly affected the political behaviour of people (Wald \textit{et al.}, 1998). By way of illustration, connection with such institutions has resulted in a wide increase in political participation in various countries (Brown & Brown, 2003; Jamal, 2005). While Islamist groups

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were perceived as radical fringe elements for decades, they have gradually entered the mainstream of the incumbent political life. Therefore, it has been practically unrealizable for most decision-makers to rule-off religion from the political agenda. They press their beliefs as guides for governmental decision-making or public policy and their historical appeal is augmented by multiple references, ranging from insisting on prayer and the teaching of Islamic modules in public schools to the imposition of abortion for the whole society (Hollenbach, 1993). These arguments are often reinforced by attempts to base both constitutional and penal law on Sharia.

2. Religious Pressure Groups and Politics
Since post-Cold War era, numerous groups around the world have attempted to extend their political rights and duties and increase their autonomy in the state and religious groups are no exception. Party membership has dramatically decreased following the World War II, whereas membership in pressure groups has rapidly increased (Coxall, 2013). Pressure groups can be external or internal to formal power, or as Almond and Coleman (1960) note, they may even be found in government. They are usually divided into cause and interest groups in terms of their purpose, and insider and outsider groups based on their relationship to the government (Heywood, 2011).

A religious institution becomes a political pressure group when it incorporates politics into its identity and determines that politics is a crucial means of achieving its goals. In the case of politicization, the leaders and rank-and-file members advocate organizational political engagement, the organization facilitates political activity, and the context in which the institution exists becomes amendable to political action (McDaniel, 2008). Such institutions communicate political activity as a norm for their members and encourage political knowledge and skills of the members. Nevertheless, the state processes, the prevailing forces of the environment and the organizational culture affects the extent to which politicization occurs (Albert & Whetten, 1985).

Nonetheless, regimes are actually principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures and they cannot be considered actors (Barnett & Fineemore, 1999). As Dowding (2003: 306) remarks, “only actors can have power and the structures lack power”. Thus, the study of the impacts religion on power is closely associated with the study of the role of religious institutions in the political scenes.

3. Political Islam
The historical connection between Islam and politics was as an attempt by the rulers to legitimatize their actions. Theorizing the relation of religion and politics was produced under the shadow of the Caliphate in the Islamic world. It was the reverse of the European experience, where church interfered in politics. The traditional jurists forged a link between religion and
politics by giving a religious legitimacy to political power (Ayubi, 1991). The current political Islamists also maintain that religion and politics cannot be separated. However, because they are mostly in the position of resisting the existing states - not legitimizing them - they seek the politicization of a particular vision of religion to vindicate the anti-state movements. Hence, the contemporary Islamists are more selective and less textual in their approach. Furthermore, the modernization waves in Muslim countries mostly benefited the secular elite whereas it had little influence on the life of the poor. The lower classes rather faced social deprivation and political unrepresentativeness. Not only did most seculars fail to modernize their societies, they also could not end their states’ dependence on the West. This paved the way for a resurgence of political movements with a role for religion (Sahliyeh, 1990). Since the 1970s, both states and their opponent movements used Islam to increase their power and gain more support from the society and Islamic-oriented policies began to emerge (Haddad et al., 1991). The prevalent slogan used by the Islamists ‘Islam is the solution’ indicates a potent appeal for the new political Islam throughout Muslim countries (Sisk, 1992). The political Islam is expected to persist as a powerful movement seriously challenging the regimes, at least until their social and political appeals are satisfactorily considered by the rulers or otherwise, or until the religious actors come to power and demonstrate how capable they fulfil their promises.

4. Methodology
This paper is one of the very few research projects working on comparative studies on the role of organized Islam, particularly as pressure groups, in Muslim-majority countries. It employs the most similar system design to analyze countries with similar characteristics (Carsten, 2008). Neither Pakistan nor Turkey fit appropriately into either the democratic or authoritarian categories. Constitutionally, the will of people is specified as the source of sovereignty, with the national and local elections orderly held in these countries. Nevertheless, the elected officials constitutionally share the exercise of political power with institutions that do not obtain their power directly from the will of people. Overall, the similarities between societies and the common features of the political structure of such countries warrant comparison. However, historical, cultural and ethnic differences have resulted in differences in the extent of religious institutions’ power and their approaches to pursuing their demands.

Comparative politics includes a comparison of different political systems. It is affiliated with the exploration of patterns, processes, and regularities of policy-making, and the different actors’ approaches to gaining political power (O’Neil, 2004). The role of actors, however, should be evaluated with regard to the political environment of the countries, with the actors’ interconnectedness and mutual determination necessary to be recognized (Kennett, 2001). This paper entirely relies upon the secondary data due to the sufficient literature examining the religious institutions in Turkey and Pakistan. Therefore, the contribution of the study will be to summarize and evaluate the existing literature on the political role and influence of the Islamic
actors in policy-making processes in the two countries.

5. A Historical Background

Religion was incorporated into the Ottoman empire structure and the Sultan was regarded as the protector of Islam. Nevertheless, following the collapse of the regime and formation of Republic in 1923, the Islamic institutions’ funds were sequestrated and religious leaders were suppressed as the remained potential bases of civil disorder (Zeidan, 1999). However, the threat of the new dividing lines, such as social division and territorial fragmentation, forced the state to create a monopoly on the interpretation of Islam in order to gain control over the religious institutions while the Islamist movements were gradually emerging again. A strict control of religion was exercised through authoritarian politics during the one-party period before the 1950s (Toprak, 1988). Through an early politicization of religion ‘from above’, the state de facto nationalized the Sunni Islam by fusing Islamic symbols with nationalism. However, under the military’s tutelage, religious education became compulsory in the 1970s-1980s and Quran classes were opened to insulate the society from the influence of communism (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). Nevertheless, the politicization of Islam ‘from below’ began with Turkey’s transition to a democratic multi-party system in the 1950s (Karakas, 2007). Strengthening the role of such institutions is mostly rooted in the post-1970s’ history of the country. It includes the formation of Milli Gorus in the 1970s, the reforms carried out by Ozal in the mid-1980s, an inflow of capital from the Arab world, and the sweeping victories of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the post-2000s’ national and regional elections. These events must be combined with the foreign pressuring leverages on the state including the market liberalization policy, the EU proposed accession and the political reforms to meet the 1999 Copenhagen criteria (Bac, 2005). Such reforms weakened the historical powerful control of the military (Hughes, 2004; Tachau & Heper, 1983). Furthermore, Turkey went through a huge transformation, experiencing large-scale industrialization, immigration from rural areas to cities and urbanization in the 1980s and the 1990s (Cagaptay, 2007). The new immigrants from peripheral areas were the religiously conservative people, supporting the Islamic groups (Narli, 1999). The result of such changes, as well as economic discontent was an increase in the political power of the religious groups. On the other hand, clergy usually occupied a prevailing position of the power in the political structure of the Indian subcontinent as well. For instance, they were a crucial part of the legal system for most of the Mogul period which ruled most of the subcontinent during the mid-16th to mid-19th centuries (Alam, 1986). Although the Moguls’ power gradually declined, the mutual support between the clergy and the British Raj led to the foundation of the Islamic educational centres in the late 19th and Muslim League Party in 1906. The latter gave rise to a massive separation movement which gained widespread popularity among the Muslim population of the subcontinent from the 1920s (Glasse, 2001; Kumar, 1990). The Muslim Northern and Eastern provinces united in the late 1930s and welcomed the formation of two
independent states, exposed in the 1940 Lahore Resolution (Blood, 1995). Although clerics first accused the 1947 formation of Pakistan of being a tool to weaken Muslims whose goal was returning to rule the whole India, they finally joined the mass migration and pressed for a leadership position instead (Hussain, 2010; Nawab, 2009). Nevertheless, Islam soon became the ideology of the state and a tool for defining and strengthening the national identity and religious leaders gradually became more powerful (Grare, 2006). Numerous circumstances are crucial amongst the forces of growth and the progress of the Pakistani religious institutions. These include domestic circumstances, such as weak economic and political institutions, the formidable military rules that helped the Islamists, and efforts to win political and economic support from the Arab world following the 1980s (Wirsing, 2004; Fuller, 1991). They also encompass a number of external factors, including the ideological Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran, the huge labour migration to Arab countries, a decade-long war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the opportunity to infiltrate Islamic militants into neighbouring India, the separation of Bangladesh, the fall of the Taliban regime, and the massive mobilization of the Indian forces on Pakistan’s borders (Winthrop & Graff, 2010; Haqqani, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flourishing Period</strong></td>
<td>Ottomans</td>
<td>Moghuls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Massive Suppression Period</strong></td>
<td>Following the Republic</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entered the Mainstream of Polities</strong></td>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opening the Window of Opportunity</strong></td>
<td>1970s-1980s and post-2000s</td>
<td>During the military rules and regional crises</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Isolation Period</strong></td>
<td>Military rule</td>
<td>Civilian rule</td>
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6. Power Structure

Turkey has been constantly secular since the establishment of the Republic regime, although the Constitution has been amended several times. However, Turkey has been a multi-party democracy since the 1950s and the rise of a strong religion-based movement later undermined its traditional orientation. Nonetheless, while the Constitution 1982 had established a parliamentary democracy based on popular sovereignty, it had limited the exercise of power of popular sovereignty by providing for the formal participation of unelected actors in policy-making. Indeed, it had established a dual system of executive decision-making, a joint exercise of power by the government and military, a fragile parliament without a strong immunity of the members, and a judiciary that was practically under the pressure from the military. Imagine the policies in the 1980s and the 1990s, lifting the immunity of the Kurdish parties’ members, the
dismissal of Erbakan, the abolition of Islamic parties, such as Refah, and the imprisonment of a large number of Islamist politicians (Shambayati, 2004). The military has directly intervened in politics several times, each of which has been justified as necessary to either safeguard or re-establish Kemalism (Tachau & Heper, 1983). Nonetheless, it gradually intended to return power to elected politicians. The constitution was extensively amended in 2001 to nullify the 1980s-military intervention and again in 2010, in compliance with the standards of the EU through a referendum. The Prime Minister of Turkey used to be considered the head of government, with the President holding a relatively ceremonial role, although this was changed through the 2017 referendum. Legislative power in Turkey is vested in the unicameral Grand National Assembly. The military’s traditional role is undergoing a transformation, mostly due to the rise of power of Islamic-rooted institutions, the reforms towards the EU accession and changes in Turkey-US relation. The results of the recent elections imply that the Islamic institutions have a greater support than the army. Turkish religious groups have acted as grassroots organizations for long, historically providing social services to the society better than the state. Such services have been received by a large number of people, whereas they also promoted a civic religious life (Yavuz, 2009; Ugur, 2007). The AKP is now willing to merge all Islamic groups and does not stand the parallel streams, especially after the massive ongoing purges which began in 2016.

During the six decades since Pakistan’s independence, the country has moved towards different types of government and has also struggled with various constitutions and power structures. Pakistan has swung between the poles of dictatorship and democracy, as well as between civilian and the military rule throughout its history (Newberg, 2002). Pakistan has a multi-party federal parliamentary system where according to the Constitution (2004), legislative power is widely vested in the Parliament. Nevertheless, there have been abundant clashes on the number and allocation of representatives in the Parliament owing to the federal system’s shortcomings of electoral arrangements. Moreover, the independence of the legislature has been mostly negated since the executive branch has frequently dominated the political system. Therefore, the Parliament has practically failed to supervise the government, as required in a typical parliamentary system (Zain, 2010). Likewise, due to the existence of impotent political parties and a lack of well-organized public opinion, the parliamentary system is extensively fragile (Choudhury, 1956). On the other hand, the executive has repeatedly pressurized the judiciary through the abuse of power of the appointment of judges on political considerations, the imposition of amendments in the Constitution, and the refusal of legal processes for governmental actions (Ahmed, 2005). To illustrate, there has been a parallel between the judges’ decisions and military orders (Khan, 2005). The military in Pakistan alongside the Intelligence, as a subordinate of the army, have been extremely authoritarian, ruling for almost half of the history of the country (Newberg, 2002). This is shown by several successful military coups in three decades. Indeed, the power structure has been influenced mainly by either a diarchy between President and the Chief of Military, or a triarchy between President, Prime
Minister and the Chief of Military (Hussain & Hussain, 1993). Civil society during the coups have commonly obeyed the military rule or been silent (Wollack, 2002). During the civilian rule, they have also been lacking the acceptable structure or resources required for emerging as a strong force (Nazeer, 2004). Overall, there are three major intersecting fault lines in Pakistan’s political scene: between civilians and the military, amongst different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists. A number of issues, such as the role of religion in the state affairs, the division of power between the branches of government and the authority of the provinces have not been settled by constitutional means or through voting in Pakistan.

Table 2. Power Structure in Turkey and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Secularism</td>
<td>Strict before the 2000s</td>
<td>With opportunities for Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions</td>
<td>Ban on party formation and political action</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Coups</td>
<td>Regular, but returning power more easily</td>
<td>Regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Government</td>
<td>National, prime ministerial towards presidential</td>
<td>Federal, prime ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Army’s Power</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Amendments</td>
<td>In favour of religious institutions</td>
<td>In favour of religious institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Power of Civil Society</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Religious Groups and Public Policy-making

7.1. Turkey
Social services to the new urban migrants are perceived as a basis for the religious groups’ political success. The vast majority of the population will have lived in urban areas by 2020 and accordingly, religiosity may emerge as the defining feature of the growing urban lower-middle classes. These segments of the society provide the conservative groups with a necessary mass support (Cagaptay, 2011). The housing agency has recently implemented new dwelling projects in the poor urban areas with long-term payments (Sonmez, 2013). Also, most profitable construction projects are allocated to the companies affiliated with religious groups, leading to the emergence of a new Islamic bourgeois class who financially support the Islamic parties (Yesilada & Rubin, 2011; Gurcan & Peker, 2014). New megaprojects, such as Atasehir and Camlica mosques, aim to change large cities from Kemalist heritages to the legacies of the Ottoman empire. This is also shown by new constructions near the symbols of Kemalism, such
as Taksim and Gezi, or the destruction of Emek Cinema (Yildirim, 2012; Gurcan & Peker, 2014). Only between (2006-2009), 9000 new mosques have been built all across the country (Diyanet, 2011). Such policies have also strengthened Islamic banking, providing Islamist businesses with new opportunities.

Although Islamic groups have attempted to pressurize the government through their conferences, legal actions, aid campaigns, demonstrations and publications, their influence increases in the areas mostly associated with the events in the Muslim world, as Turkey still remains an ally of the West and a member of the NATO. Another policy change was the massive support for Assad’s opponents since 2011, turning Turkey to an enemy base of the Syrian regime. Undermining the EU accession and relationship with a number of European countries, as well as declining the historical positive relation with Israel are the signs that Turkey looks forward to a leadership status in the Middle East (Guiora, 2013). Islamism in foreign policy can mean that Turkey as a Muslim country should close its ties with the Islamic world, rather than the West. However, Turkish foreign policy is imbedded in the West to a great extent, institutionally, economically and strategically. Hence, policies in a number of areas mostly associated with the political and economic life of Turkey are affected more by the international contexts than the Islamic groups’ pressures (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008).

Another successful bill passed in 2010 was lifting the headscarf ban, followed by further reforms on wearing Hijab in the public sector and the army. After decades of struggle, this was an end for Turkish Islamic women who were forced to either save their religion or continuing their education. Kadioglu(2005) suggests that religious groups have had a great role in lobbying the politicians and organising public opinion to lift the ban. According to Gole(1996), this movement was backed by various groups of Islamist feminists, challenging the secular elites’ dominance. Islamic-rooted groups and parties lacked enough power to challenge the strict secular policies of the state, whereas they gradually emerged as important. The party has taken effective steps towards controlling the military, mostly through the implementation of the EU reform packages in 2003 and 2004. While the former turned the National Security Council to a consultative body, the latter abolished security courts and also, dismissed military members from both Education and Broadcasting Councils. Further steps were taken in 2010 and 2011 in appointing the commanders and four-star generals to weaken the Army’s historical influence. Also, new decisions were made regarding the immunity of the conservative members of the military, of whom over 1600 members were fired during the two past decades (Kuru, 2012).

While the ruling party has not been seeking to implement Sharia, it is rather attempting to reproduce a national religious identity for the society (Driessen, 2014). Nevertheless, more non-Islamic issues drop off the agenda in the recent decade. For instance, medical professional centers’ attempts to legalize euthanasia have failed, despite the formal commitment of Turkey to the Western lifestyle (Aksoy, 2005). Likewise, the chance of placing similar issues on the institutional agenda of the government has decreased. For example, Erdogan has repeatedly
criticized abortion and vouched families with three children, or Kavaf, the Minister of Family and Social Policy, officially called homosexuality a biological disorder, a disease (Gurcan & Peker, 2014). A large number of Imam Hatip’s graduates have been appointed to governmental positions. The Party has also focused on the power of media by establishing a large new media network in order to shape the preferences of the society, meanwhile, many secular media corporations have been forced to shut and numerous journalists have been imprisoned (Murat & Hawks, 2012). New restricting policies regarding retail alcohol sales, its advertisement, and setting up new bars based on their distance with mosques have been adopted since 2013. The rate of alcohol taxation rapidly increased between 2012 and 2015. Likewise, Erdogan’s called for yogurt as the national drink with the motto one nation, one drink’, to delegitimize alcohol. Nonetheless, none of the abovementioned decisions can be translated to Islamism. Furthermore, neither running the newly single-sex buses in Malathia, nor adding jihad notion to religion lectures and removing Darwin’s theory from the school books mean that AKP’s intention is to establish an Islamic country. For instance, in the Bikini Controversy in 2007, the ruling party denied such a restrictive plan while it could state that using women body in ads is commercializing women or claiming that it was inappropriate in a Muslim society (Somer, 2007). Such policies show that the Turkish Islamism is rather a movement towards seizing power, which is poor ideologically with unclear orientations and targets (Cinar & Duran, 2008). As Kuru(2009) states, decision-making in Turkey is more of a conflict between assertive seculars (Kemalists) and passive seculars (Islamic conservatives). Thus, most recent attempts have focused on changing the mechanisms of structural power rather than adopting Islamic policies. Establishing Islamic businesses, anti-Kurdish and anti-Alevi policies, and appointing Islamic women as bureaucrats do not imply a decrease in the pragmatism of the party, since at least, the economy of the state still largely depends on profitable mortgages which are prohibited in Islam.

7.2. Pakistan

Although clerics first opposed the formation of Pakistan, they revised their position and soon sought for establishing an Islamic state. Their unmet demands included a ministry for religious affairs, an Islamic constitutional committee, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam office. While an Islamic consultative council was formed, its recommendations were ignored by the seculars (Ansari, 2011). However, condemnation of violent activities against Ahmadis by the Court of Inquiry (1954), was the last attempt to sack Islam from Pakistan (Nasr, 1994). Ahmadis were finally recognised as non-Muslim in the 1974 Amendment (Constitution the Second Amendment, 1974). Similar pressures from the Islamists also led to changing the title of the country from ‘Pakistan’ to ‘The Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ in the 1963 constitution (Weekes, 1964; Feldman, 1967).

Secular leaders such as Ayyub Khan facilitated the Islamisation process. For example, he asked for the clergy’s Fatwa to delegitimize the candidacy of Fatima Jinnah in the 1965 election. His
modernizing reforms between the years 1958 to 1965 were opposed by the clergy and this forced him to retreat of the second reform period between 1965 to 1969 (Ansari, 2011). Nonetheless, the mosque and the army started to form a union during the presidency of Yahiya Khan. East Pakistan’s secession and the birth of Bangladesh reinforced this cooperation through efforts towards national cohesion (Haqqani, 2005). A greater Islamisation plan was followed by Zulfiqar Bhutto who embedded religious education into schools and adopted Islamic-oriented foreign policies (Hussain, 2010). Meanwhile, the sanctification of Islamic provisions in the 1973 constitution took place to silence the clergy (Misra & Clarke, 2012). Nevertheless, the Islamist parties and the army formed a coalition to overthrow Bhutto in 1977. Similarly, the Muslim League-Nawaz Branch lost a large number of votes due to the formation of such an alliance in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s; the same coalition was again built in the 2008 election to defeat the socialist parties (Haqqani, 2005). Zia removed the restrictions of the traditional Islamic charity in the late 1970s, allowing direct public contributions to local mosques, religious schools, and seminaries (Wirsing, 2004). As a result, both the number and importance of these institutions rapidly increased thereafter.

The common feature of the policies pursued by the Pakistani governments -especially since the 1980s- has been an emphasis on promoting compliance with the religious values through Islamic laws (Ghazali, 1999). While the army was only interested in using Islamist groups in Kashmir, the members of such institutions are brainwashed in a way that their activities could not be limited to one region. They are often taught to fight for their counterparts in other countries, however, when foreign missions are completed and they return home, they challenge the government. A perfect example is attacking the US embassy in Islamabad in 1999 (Singh, 2015). A number of clerics have called for general attacks on the West’s interests in Pakistan since 2001 (Howenstein, 2008). Likewise, a chain of bombings destroyed the Christian churches in different cities in 2002. Such events imply that Islamic groups have gradually gone out of the control of the military and one of the targets for the jihadist groups has turned to Pakistan itself, including its politicians. In the past, a cluster of Islamist groups tended to carry out operations in Kashmir and India, whereas the internal sectarian groups would attack the domestic rivals, such as the religious minorities (Swami, 2003). However, the military operations of the jihadist groups inside the country doubled only between 2006 and 2009 (Walsh, 2010).

The common assumption is that the clerics are beholden to the military. Nonetheless, as Stern (2001) points out, the military is increasingly influenced by the Islamic thoughts of the religious leaders. According to Nawab (2009) and Rizvi (2002), clerics have successfully infiltrated the military, especially in the lower rungs. Nevertheless, the army’s long-standing support for such groups is a tactical approach concerned with pursuing the army’s goals outside Pakistan, especially Kashmir (Murphy, 2001). Moreover, the power of clerics over the Tribal Areas has encouraged the state to ask for the assistance of religious groups where it is not able to deal with the issues raised (Abbas, 2006). Look no further than the ceasefire agreement with the
Mujahidin Shura in North Waziristan, or the surrender of Al-Qaeda and other foreign groups in 2006. In return, religious groups have repeatedly sought for different types of reward, ranging from the amnesty of members, to financial incentives, to the implementation of an Islamic agenda (Asia Report, 2006). Such groups join peripheral groups in agitating against the state when the state is not acting to further the interests of Islam. For instance, when the Islamic parties and groups were encouraged by the national government to protect the new laws from vigilantism and violence, clerics threatened to commit jihadi operations. On the contrary, a number of provincial governments strengthened the Sharia through law enforcement, and also by appointing clerics to rule the court (Nawab, 2009).

Violence, however, has been inseparable part of the religious groups’ strategy of sending a clear message to the government that Islamisation process is slowed or blocked. The demand for the implementation of Sharia laws has not been limited to the provinces where Islamic parties won the election. In 2007, clerics called for the Islamisation of the capital. With the support of the Lal Mosque school students, they destroyed music and video rental stores and threatened the owners to start alternative businesses (Nawab, 2009). Moreover, although the blasphemy law had always been used against Ahmadis for four decades, their lands were also confiscated by the Punjab government in 2010. They are deprived of the burying of the dead in public cemeteries and any of their collective movements can end with a massacre, such as the one in 2010 (Wells, 2015: 20). In Punjab, religious leaders have also actively affected policy-making. The so-called ‘Western policies’ have been repeatedly rejected by the religious groups in the province. A case in point is threatening mixed-gender marathons and attacking the cinemas and theatre halls in 2005 (White, 2008).

The Islamic parties have never secured greater than 10 percent of the public vote in the national elections, whereas the religious groups have shown a great capacity for mobilizing street power and launching massive campaigns, especially to discredit the government (Murphy, 2011). Prayer leaders, for instance, who hold the lectern of Friday prayers, have emerged as potent pressure groups. They include the Khateebs, Imams, and Moazzins, all of whom pressurize the administration to turn the policies into their favor (Niaz, 2011). In the provinces where they held the majority in the Parliament, religious groups have successfully moved towards the implementation of an Islamic agenda. By way of illustration, after provincial elections’ successes, the local parliament of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa passed laws prohibiting bank interest, turning Friday to the holiday, enforcing the use of scarves, banning male doctors and trainers for the female society, and forbidding film industry in 2003. They also established an Islamic punitive commission that launched stoning, whipping, amputation of limps and capital punishment for blasphemy. In addition, they passed a ban on dance and music in 2005 (Misra & Clarke, 2012). Also, the government successfully passed another ban on the use of women's images on street billboards and removed all the public ads highlighting women in the same year (Shah, 2006).
Table 3. Organized Religion and Public Policy in Turkey and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
<td>Minor effects</td>
<td>Major effects, mostly regionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Policy</strong></td>
<td>Minor effects but increasing</td>
<td>Major effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Tactics</strong></td>
<td>Grassroots, business, civil, election</td>
<td>Violence, sabotage, overt conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Areas of Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Minor domestically, minor internationally</td>
<td>Medium domestically, major internationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influencing the society</strong></td>
<td>Media, grassroots, formal policy, anti-Westernism</td>
<td>Madaris, mosques, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exchanges with Government</strong></td>
<td>Businesses and social services</td>
<td>Kashmir crisis and domestic rivals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Comparison

Although the 1923 republic was greatly inspired by modernization and secularism, the 1947 birth of Pakistan, was an attempt to establish a Muslim country. While the Turkish Islamic institutions were massively suppressed, numerous Pakistani clerics pressed for a religio-political leadership position. However, Pakistan constitutionally remained secular as well. Hence, religious institutions in both countries were isolated following the formation of the new regimes. Army in both countries has often intervened in politics, by pressurizing the statesmen and parliamentarians or through arrest, threatening and the seizure of power. However, the international/EU pressures have held the Turkish military in isolation since the 2000s and led to the Islamist movements to rise to power, whereas in Pakistan, mostly due to a lack of international pressure as well as continuous foreign crises, the military’s role has never reduced. Nonetheless, an opportunity was provided for the Islamists in Turkey in the 1950s, by moving from one-party rule to a multi-party parliamentary system, and for the Pakistani groups by forming coalitions with the Army’s support in the 1970s. Both countries’ Islamist groups also benefited from their connections with the Arab world particularly since the 1980s.

Turkish religious groups have shaped foreign policy to a limited extent and mostly towards Israel and the Arab world countries and through their demonstrations, campaigns and legal actions. Likewise, they have affected domestic policies in certain areas. They have also pressed for appointing religious schools’ graduates to governmental positions. In Pakistan, owing to the provincial political system, the Islamic groups’ direct influence on policies is mostly visible at the local level. Their influence increases where Islamist parties hold the majority of the provincial assemblies. At national levels, nonetheless, the Islamist groups’ influence on the government’s agenda is bound up with their exchanges with the state over Kashmir crisis, Afghanistan security, local tribes’ uprisings and violent activities, all of which link such groups
with the military. In Turkey, the Islamic institutions have become extensively powerful since the 2000s. Due to the increasing immigration trend of the residents of rural regions to urban areas, the power of the Turkish Islamic groups is expected to increase. In Pakistan, they have performed most dismally in the periods of civilian rule. While the Turkish Islamic movement has usually adopted more mainstream strategies than radical goals, this cannot be clearly seen among the Pakistani groups. Moreover, with regards to social conservatism, while the vast majority of the Pakistani people believe that the rules of the Quran should be strictly enforced in the country, only a minority of the Turkish share such an idea (Poushter, 2015).

Table 4. A Comparison between Religious Groups in Turkey and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to the Government</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest Successful Islamic Actor</td>
<td>Either outsider or high-profile insider</td>
<td>High or low-profile insider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Pressure Groups</td>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>Cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Conservatism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to the Military</td>
<td>Full of tension</td>
<td>Favourable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Discussion
First of all, simple models of insider and outsider pressure groups does not properly fit the status of religious institutions in the two countries, where religious groups have been deprived of political power for decades and a real transition has not happened for several years. Instead, they have become part of the ruling class. Nonetheless, their position may change from low-profile to high-profile insiders. However, consistent with the purpose-based distinction of pressure groups, the Pakistani institutions still resemble cause groups since seldom have they widely revised their goals and domestic functions. On the contrary, Turkish religious groups have established economic ties with the ruling party and changed from cause groups to interest groups. Second, the military does not necessarily block the activities of religious institutions or restrict their activities. Conversely, the Pakistani groups have flourished during the military rule. The fixed power of Pakistan’s military compels the religious institutions to focus more on their exchanges with military, such as violent activities for the Implementation of Islamic law. On the other hand, the decreasing power of the Turkish military has resulted in the civil efforts of the Islamic movements. Third, religious groups in Pakistan have generally acted more successfully than religious parties. Acting as pressure groups does not only reduce the socio-political costs of their actions, but also brings fewer responsibilities and less unaccountability. Nonetheless, the Pakistani religious institutions would possibly disagree on both methods and the content of the Islamisation process. On the other hand, the Turkish Islamic parties have been more successful than the groups. However, parties and pressure groups in both countries have formed a larger
social movement. Fourth, the difference between the role and function of religious institutions in Pakistan and Turkey is not only the outcome of the power structure in such countries, but it is also rooted in the difference of the notion of the Islamic leadership, political culture and social conservatism between the two countries. Turkish Islamism has been attempting to establish coherent pressure groups to be in alliance with the ruling party, while considering the sectionalism in Pakistan, the Islamist groups are far from coherently acting. Lastly, increase in the power of the pressure groups does not limit the reality of the modern state. Conversely, current states are actually the processes of groups’ interactions, and public policies are the balance of power between groups. The politics of pressure groups is a process rather than a collection of distinct institutions. An advantage of group theories is taking into consideration the complexity of government corridors, as well as resolving the problem of separation between political institutions (e.g. pressure groups and political parties) in policy studies regardless of their type or influence on policy-making processes, as they usually act seamlessly in practice. Theories that assume policy-making a multi-layered process and account for the activities of groups are necessary to understand the chaos of policy-making. Contrary to the linear models, the government is no longer understandable as a whole, and its various parts are invariably in conflict.

References


