Networks of Mutual Responsibility: An Accountable Co-Stewardship Model for Constitutional Political Economy2

Elahi, Nasser

doi:10.48308/jep.2026.245617.1290

Networks of Mutual Responsibility: An Accountable Co-Stewardship Model for Constitutional Political Economy2

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Nasser Elahi

Associate Professor, School of Economic Thought, Department of Economic, Mofid University, Qom, Iran.

10.48308/jep.2026.245617.1290

Abstract

This paper tackles the foundational dilemma of institutional design in constitutional political economy: how to create institutions that resist both the "trap of legal paralysis" (Buchanan) and the "arbitrary authority" in states of exception (Schmitt). We argue the solution lies in moving beyond purely legalistic or power-driven frameworks toward an integrated theoretical synthesis of Accountable Co‑Stewardship. Theoretically, we synthesize methodological individualism from public choice with social embeddedness from economic sociology (Granovetter), resulting in a framework of embedded methodological individualism. This framework translates into an operational model, Dispersed Responsibility Agency (DRA), with four interconnected components: (1) radical transparency, (2) empowerment of dispersed monitors, (3) reciprocal accountability, and (4) institutional co-constitution. The model is grounded in the ethical principle of kullukum rāʿin ("each of you is a shepherd"), reinterpreted as a universal ethic of mutual trusteeship, bridging covenantal ethics with modern governance. Analytically, we apply the DRA model to examine three governance crises: Iceland's "Pots and Pans Revolution" (bottom-up constitutional co-construction), Taiwan's digital democracy ecosystem (institutionalized technological monitoring), and South Korea's "Candlelight Revolution" (civil solidarity overcoming concentrated material power). The illustrative cases suggest that DRA can serve as a potentially useful analytical framework, illustrating how societies can leverage networks of mutual responsibility to evolve from crisis toward more accountable, transparent, and adaptive governance. The paper ultimately offers a conceptual and operational pathway for transforming the "state of exception" into a "state of responsibility," with implications for constitutional design, democratic innovation, and institutional resilience in an age of uncertainty.

Highlights

§ Integrating constitutional economics, epistemic pluralism, and covenantal ethics.

§ Dispersed Responsibility Agency (DRA) transcends the Buchanan–Schmitt dilemma.

§ Four components: transparency, empowerment, accountability, and co-constitution.

§ Case studies from Iceland, Taiwan, and South Korea illustrate DRA.

§ Transforming the "state of exception" into a "state of responsibility."

Keywords

Accountable Co-Stewardship

Dispersed Responsibility Agency

Constitutional Political Economy

Polycentric Democracy

Reciprocal Trusteeship

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